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Reassessing Standing in
Hollingsworth v. Perry: The Shareholder
Derivative Suit as a Model for
Public Interest Litigation
William F. Kelly*
INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2013, the United States Supreme Court handed
down two controversial decisions on the issue of same-sex
marriage. In one, United States v. Windsor, the Court struck
down section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act—which
provided that same-sex couples could not be recognized as
spouses for purposes of federal law—as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.1 In the other, Hollingsworth
v. Perry, the Court refused to hear a constitutional challenge to
California’s Proposition 8—which amended the state constitution
to define marriage as between a man and a woman—holding that
the Proponents of the proposition did not have standing to defend
the law in federal court.2 Although it was the first of the two
cases that the Court adjudicated on the merits, it ultimately will
be the latter that will have the more remarkable implications for
American governance. Regardless of one’s opinion of the practical
short-term results for same-sex marriage in California, the
long-term consequences of the Court’s ruling will almost
certainly undermine the democratic nature of state governments
across the country.
The Court’s refusal to hear the merits of the Hollingsworth
case might initially appear to be inconsequential and constitute
just another procedural ruling. After all, federal courts
frequently refuse to hear cases on jurisdictional grounds. But—as
this Comment will, in part, attempt to show—the circumstances
in Hollingsworth are very different, and the decision, though
procedural in nature, substantially undercuts the system of

* J.D., Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, May 2015. B.A.,
Cedarville University, 2012. I want to thank Professor John Eastman for his assistance in
helping me research and write this Comment.
1 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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checks and balances inherent in the American system of
government. In particular, it reveals a gaping hole in the Court’s
doctrine of standing that, in effect, allows the executive branch of
government to disregard the law without legal accountability.
As will be shown in Parts I and II of this Comment, the
Hollingsworth decision is very troubling to the extent that it
allows executive officials to operate outside the confines of the
law. No person—neither citizen, legislator, nor governor—is
above the law, and the Court should not be interpreting the
Constitution to allow such a result. To the extent that the result
of Hollingsworth seems both a proper application of its recent
standing doctrine (as will be shown in Part III) and yet
nonetheless unacceptable as a matter of policy, the Court should
find itself compelled to reconsider that precedent upon which its
decision stands. Perhaps it is time to revisit the constitutional
doctrine of standing altogether. It is certainly not without its
critics.3 Or maybe the Court needs to reassess the line it draws
between constitutional and prudential standing and be willing to
recognize additional exceptions to some of its judicially conceived
rules. Such exceptions are certainly not without precedent. Part
IV of this Comment discusses the shareholder derivative suit as
an important example of the Court making an exception to
certain standing requirements in corporate law for purposes of
furthering important policy objectives. It is therefore suggested
that—just as the Court recognizes a standing exception in
corporate law for the derivative suit—the Court should recognize
an exception in the Hollingsworth scenario where it is not just an
investor’s financial return at stake, but rather the rule of law
itself.
I. THE PROBLEM: THE BACKGROUND OF HOLLINGSWORTH
In order to fully grasp the significance of the problem posed
by the decision, it is important to understand the broader context
of Hollingsworth and the extensive efforts made by the people of
California to adopt a particular piece of legislation.4 Under
article II, section 8 of the California state constitution, voters
3 Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending—The Role of Legal and Equitable
Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (“[D]issatisfaction with the standing doctrine is not
new, and has been expressed by many commentators.”); Heather Elliott, Congress’s
Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 171 (2011) (describing the
doctrine of standing as “confusing and unpredictable”); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is
Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1775 (1999) (describing modern standing
law as “extraordinarily complicated” and “impossible to defend as [a] plausible
interpretation[] of the Constitution”).
4 For a summary of the background of Hollingsworth, see HENRY S. NOYES, THE
LAW OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY xxx–li (2014).
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have reserved to themselves the right to an initiative process
whereby they can adopt statutes and constitutional amendments
through a direct vote by the people.5 In November 2000, eight
years before Proposition 8, the California voters exercised this
power and adopted Proposition 22 as a revision to the state
family code.6 Entitled the California Defense of Marriage Act,
this statutory amendment provided that “[o]nly marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California.”7 In 2004, however, Mayor Gavin Newsom ordered the
City of San Francisco to begin issuing same-sex marriage licenses
in violation of state law.8 This action marked the first instance in
a series of disconcerting decisions whereby government officials
acted in intentional dereliction of their duties to enforce the laws
of the state. In a consolidated suit joining actions filed by both
supporters of same-sex marriage seeking to overturn the statute
and opponents seeking to enjoin the City of San Francisco from
violating the law,9 the California superior court determined that
the amended statute violated the California Constitution’s equal
protection clause.10 In May 2008, after that case had worked its
way through the court system, the California Supreme Court
affirmed the superior court’s original ruling and held that
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d,
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652 (2013).
7 CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2014) declared unconstitutional by In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
8 See Sylvia A. Law, Who Gets to Interpret the Constitution? The Case of Mayors and
Marriage Equality, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L 1, 4 (2007). See generally In re Coordination
Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 1550(c)], Marriage Cases, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005).
9 Unlike in federal court, under California precedent, state courts will allow private
“citizens who are not personally affected . . . [to] sue to compel performance of a public
duty.” In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 690 (Ct. App. 2006); see also Green
v. Obledo, 624 P.2d 256, 267 (Cal. 1981). But cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 573–74 (1992) (noting that the Supreme Court generally refuses, under the doctrine
of standing, to allow federal courts to hear such cases). The California Supreme Court
interestingly allowed the Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education Fund to enjoin the
City of San Francisco from violating the law but denied them standing to maintain a
defense of the statute after temporary mandamus relief was granted. In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d at 406. The opponents of same-sex marriage could therefore compel the
city to obey the law but could not defend the law itself in court as it was being challenged
by same-sex couples. Because California Attorney General Bill Lockyer maintained a
technical defense of the statute, however, there was no serious concern about standing for
the case as a whole. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 718. Lockyer’s defense may
be described as technical in the sense that he did make a constitutional defense of the
statute, but he argued for a very narrow interpretation of it that would simply restrict the
term “marriage” but not the concurrent rights to heterosexual couples. See id.
Nevertheless, in an important sense, Lockyer fulfilled his duty as state attorney general
to defend the law in court. This, at minimum, allowed other interested parties to
intervene in the case where they could not in Hollingsworth.
10 In re Coordination Proceeding, 2005 WL 583129 at *8.
5
6
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Proposition 22 violated the state constitution.11 Later that year in
November 2008, in the very next election following the state
court’s decision, a majority of California voters adopted
Proposition 8, which essentially codified the language of
Proposition 22 in the state constitution.12 This new constitutional
amendment provided in article I, section 7.5 (immediately
following the equal protection clause in section 7) that “[o]nly
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California.”13 Where Proposition 22 had previously only amended
a statutory code, Proposition 8 amended the constitution.
Consequently, the state court’s ruling that Proposition 22
(Family Code section 308.5) violated the constitution no longer
applied because the constitution itself now explicitly allowed for
it.
In November 2008, a day after the California voters had
approved it, proponents of same-sex marriage filed suit
challenging the constitutional validity of Proposition 8 even
though it purported to amend the state constitution.14 Notably,
though listed as a respondent and tasked with a defense of the
law, California Attorney General Jerry Brown joined the
petitioners in attacking the validity of Proposition 8. Not only
was the Attorney General derelict in his duties to defend the law,
but he also went out of his way to file a brief with the court
attempting to undermine it.15 Although the California Supreme
Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 8,16
the Attorney General’s refusal to defend the law marked a second
instance of serious abuse wherein state authorities refused to
enforce the law.17
After Proposition 8 survived this challenge under the
California Constitution, two same-sex couples filed suit in federal
district court alleging that the state constitutional amendment—
Proposition 8, that is—violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.18
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 453.
Cal. Proposition 8: 8 Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry 56 (2008),
available at http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_props/1288.
13 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
14 Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59, 61 (Cal. 2009).
15 See Attorney General’s Response to Amicus Curiae Briefs, Strauss, 207 P.3d 48
(No. S168047), 2009 WL 853622.
16 Strauss, 207 P.3d at 61 (interpreting the newly amended article 1, section 7.5 very
narrowly to require only that the official designation of “marriage” not be applied to the
union of same-sex couples; same sex couples could still enjoy all the same substantive
rights as an equal protection of the laws except the use of the term marriage).
17 The City of San Francisco is once again forthrightly identified as a petitioner in
the case attacking the validity of Proposition 8.
18 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, Perry
11
12
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Seeking to bar enforcement of Proposition 8, the plaintiffs named
as defendants California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and
Attorney General Jerry Brown, among other local municipal
authorities.19 However, herein lies the problem: though in fact
named as the proper defendants in the suit, the Governor and
Attorney General refused to defend the law in court. The
district court itself recognized that “[w]ith the exception of the
Attorney General, who concedes that Proposition 8 is
unconstitutional, . . . the government defendants refused to take
a position on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims and declined to
defend Proposition 8.”20 The very same people charged with
defending and enforcing the law under the California
Constitution, refused to do so.21 Though they may have remained
nominal defendants at trial out of legal necessity as a result of
being named “defendants” in the plaintiffs’ complaint, it was the
official proponents of the initiative (“Proponents”)22 who
intervened to provide the actual defense of Proposition 8 in court.
Ultimately, after a twelve-day bench trial, the federal district
court held in favor of the plaintiffs and found that Proposition 8
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution.23
Regardless of the substantive outcome, the official state
defendants’ failure to defend the state’s constitution at trial

v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013). The Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Although Proposition 22, Proposition 8,
and the restriction of marriage to heterosexual couples was codified in the California
State Constitution, it could still be found to violate the United States Constitution and
thus be declared void. See id. art. VI (“Th[e] Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
19 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928; see also Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or
Other Relief at 3, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. CV 09 2292 VRW), 2009 WL 1490740.
20 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928. Such an admission could also raise significant
concerns about the requirement of adversity. See infra note 68.
21 CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“The Governor shall see that the law is faithfully
executed.”) (emphasis added); see also id. § 13 (“It shall be the duty of the Attorney
General to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced.”)
(emphasis added); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 955.4(b) (West 2015) (“The Attorney General shall
defend all actions on claims against the state.”).
22 The official proponents of an initiative are designated under CAL. ELEC. CODE
§ 9001(a) (West 2015) pursuant to CAL CONST. art. II, § 8. In this case, the Proponents of
Proposition 8 included Dennis Hollingsworth, Gail Knight, Martin Gutierrez, Hak-Shing
Tam, Mark Jansson, and the organization they formed, ProtectMarriage.Com—Yes On 8,
A Project of California Renewal. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 954.
23 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003–04.
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raised problematic concerns separate and apart from the
standing problem that came up on appeal in Hollingsworth.
Because the state officials necessarily remained defendants in
the suit, the Proponents could legally intervene under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,24 but the time and expense of
litigation alone might have deterred them from making such a
defense.25 In such an event, the law would go unenforced and
undefended even at trial, and the plaintiffs could theoretically
have won by default.26 Even if parties do decide to intervene, it
does not seem right that a private party should be required to
defend a state law in court; that is specifically the purpose of
government and the task of its elected state officials. It is wrong
to require a private party to bear those litigation costs simply
because the then governing officials disagree with it. It is a
complete and utter deterioration of the rule of law. The only
thing worse than requiring a private party to defend such a law27
would be prohibiting that party from defending the law. Such is
the premise of this Comment—that it would be a better option to
permit a private party to litigate a defense of the law, than to
allow the law to remain undefended altogether. Fortunately, this
option was available to the Proponents of Proposition 8 at trial
because the government officials were necessarily named as
defendants in the complaint and could not simply withdraw from
the case or cease to be parties to the action. The Proponents could
therefore intervene in the matter.
On appeal, however, the official defendants’ refusal to defend
the law becomes much more problematic. Of course, at both trial
and on appeal the defendants can—and did—refuse to
participate in a strategic legal defense of the law. Unlike at trial,
on appeal, the state officials can refuse to even remain party to
the action; in other words, they can refuse to appeal the trial
court’s ruling.28 As intervening defendants, the Proponents
attempted to appeal the decision to the Ninth Circuit, but,

FED. R. CIV. P. 24. See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
Ronald K.L. Collins & Robert M. Myers, The Public Interest Litigant in
California: Observations on Taxpayers’ Actions, 10 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 329, 355 (1977)
(indicating that the “time, effort, and potential expense of public interest litigation” will
discourage private parties from intervening, and the “legal barriers in areas such as
standing, remedial relief, and attorneys’ fees” might altogether prohibit it).
26 If the state officials refuse to defend the law—and private parties are either
unable or unwilling to intervene—then the law would not be enforced and the legal
transgressor would theoretically win in court by default. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55.
27 Of course, no private party is being compelled to defend the law; they could simply
allow it to go unenforced, but that responsibility should not fall to private citizens.
28 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660, 2667–68 (2013) (holding that
defendant-interveners who do not meet the requirements of Article III standing cannot
defend a state statute on appeal when state officials refuse to do so).
24
25
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unfortunately, it is here that the problem of standing became a
serious issue. Because the official state defendants named in the
complaint decided not to appeal—for though they had technically
lost the case and were thereby subjected to an injunction barring
the enforcement of Proposition 8, they personally agreed with the
lower court’s ruling—the Proponents had to establish
independent standing.29 Professor Matthew Hall summarizes
well how the situation changes from trial to appeal:
Defendant’s standing took center stage only after entry of judgment,
when the intervenor-defendants sought to appeal. After the district
court entered judgment for plaintiffs, the government-official
defendants took no action, but the intervenor-defendants sought
appellate review. The Proposition 8 case thus squarely presented a
potentially dispositive issue of defendant standing: namely, whether
Article III permitted the sponsors of Proposition 8 to appeal after the
government officials responsible for that law’s enforcement
themselves declined to appeal the judgment below.30

Before reaching the merits of the intervening defendants’
petition, the Ninth Circuit thus had to find that they had
standing to maintain the appeal. In order to adequately address
this issue, the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the California
Supreme Court inquiring about the Proponents’ particular
interest in and relationship to the proposition under state law.31
The state court determined that the Proponents served as agents
of the state and could therefore assert the state’s interest in
defending the law.32 As a consequence, the Ninth Circuit found
that the Proponents did have independent standing and could
therefore maintain the appeal. On reaching the merits, however,
it affirmed the lower court’s ruling and found that Proposition 8
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.33
Frustrated yet again, the Proponents appealed the decision
to the United States Supreme Court. In June 2013, the Supreme
Court made a final determination of the issue, ruling that the
Proponents did not have standing to appeal the case in federal
court.34 The Court reasoned that the Proponents had not suffered
See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1563 (2012) (citations omitted).
31 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011).
32 Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1025 (Cal. 2011) (“Accordingly, we conclude that
when the public officials who ordinarily defend a challenged measure decline to do so,
article II, section 8 of the California Constitution and the applicable provisions of the
Elections Code authorize the official proponents of an initiative measure to intervene or to
participate as real parties in interest in a judicial proceeding to assert the state's interest
in the initiative's validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure.”).
33 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012).
34 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).
29
30
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a personal individualized injury and consequently did not have a
direct stake in the outcome of the case sufficient to confer Article
III standing.35 Relying on precedent from Massachusetts
v. Mellon and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court
determined that their complaint was nothing more than a
general grievance which is shared in common with every other
citizen and so did not qualify as an individualized injury.36
Borrowing language from another case, the Court declared that
the petitioners’ “asserted right to have the Government act in
accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer
jurisdiction on a federal court.”37 Upon this reasoning then, the
Court summarily dismissed the possibility of having a citizen
step in to defend the law.38
It is the contention of this Comment that the Court should
not have so quickly—if at all—dismissed as unconstitutional the
idea of allowing a state citizen to defend a law when his or her
state officials refuse to do so. Nowhere does the Constitution
itself proscribe the raising of commonly held grievances or
necessitate that a party assert a particularized injury. Although
recently the Court has recognized these requirements as
emanating from the Constitution, in reality, their origin was in
prudential rather than constitutional doctrine.39 Thus, for the
sake of a consistent application of the standing doctrine, as well
as the substantial policy considerations discussed below, the
Court should return to its original view that these are prudential
limitations subject to exception in certain circumstances. As shall
be shown in the remainder of this Comment, the Court should
have affirmed such an exception in Hollingsworth.
In the case itself, the Court went on to address the
Proponents’ potentially unique interest as “Official Proponents”
of the initiative under California law, as well as consider the
possibility of their being agents of the state capable of asserting
its rights and interests in the law; it found neither of those
contentions persuasive and ultimately concluded that the
Proponents, as intervening defendants, did not have standing to
appeal.40 As a result, because the official state defendants
refused to appeal the trial court’s decision and because the
Proponents lacked standing, the Supreme Court vacated the

Id. at 2662.
Id. (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) and Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992)).
37 Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984)).
38 Id.
39 See infra note 84.
40 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662–68.
35
36
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Ninth Circuit’s ruling and dismissed the case, leaving only the
collusive judgment of the district court in place.41
II. THE PROBLEM: UNCORRECTED ABUSE AND THE
LITIGATION VETO
As a result of the Court’s decision in Hollingsworth, the
State of California is now left with only a federal district court
injunction that—with no binding precedential effect42—purports
to enjoin state officials from enforcing section 7.5 of the
California Constitution.43 For the same reason that they refused
to defend the law in court—namely, they disagreed with it—the
Governor and Attorney General advised all county clerks to
comply with the district court’s injunction and issue same-sex
marriage licenses from that point forward.44 Therefore, because
the very same state officials constitutionally charged with
administering the law failed to defend the law in court, a duly
enacted constitutional amendment is being undermined and
ignored by the state government.45 Again, regardless of one’s
pragmatic assessment of the Hollingsworth outcome, that these
officials could forthrightly disobey the law, without the people of
California having legal recourse or being able to hold their
representatives legally accountable, should be very disconcerting.
Notwithstanding the fact that the state adopted the initiative
system for the express purpose of placing additional political
control and governmental checks in the hands of the people,46 the
Court’s decision ultimately did nothing less than allow state
Id. at 2668.
See Benjamin G. Shatz, Gimme 5: What Every Lawyer Should Know about Stare
Decisis, L.A. COUNTY B. ASS’N. (Apr. 2008), http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm?page
id=9375 (“[T]he decisions of district courts generally have no binding precedential
effect.”); see also Stephanie Condon, Prop. 8 Judges Chide Schwarzenegger, Brown for Not
Defending Law, CBS NEWS (Dec. 6, 2010, 5:25 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/prop-8judges-chide-schwarzenegger-brown-for-not-defending-law/ (noting that the plaintiff’s
counsel conceded to the Ninth Circuit that the district court’s “ruling may only technically
apply to the two counties where the plaintiffs filed suit”).
43 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, Perry
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013).
44 Letter from Kamala D. Harris, Cal. Attorney Gen., to Edmund G. Brown Jr., Cal.
Governor 1 (June 3, 2013), available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/AG_Letter.pdf; see also
Letter from Tony Agurto, Cal. Assistant Deputy Dir. of Health Info. and Strategic
Planning, to Cnty. Clerks and Cnty. Recorders (June 26, 2013), available at http://gov.ca.
gov/docs/Letter_to_County_Officials.pdf; Governor Brown Issues Statement on Historic
Proposition 8 Ruling, CA.GOV (June 26, 2013), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php? id=18111.
45 CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“The Governor shall see that the law is faithfully
executed.”) (emphasis added); see also id. § 13 (“It shall be the duty of the Attorney
General to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced.”)
(emphasis added).
46 Statewide Initiative Guide 2013/2014, CAL. SEC’Y STATE, https://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/ballot-measures/pdf/initiative-guide.pdf.
41
42
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officials to circumvent the law. Ninth Circuit Judge Randy
Smith—who, along with the other judges serving on the appellate
court, found that the Proponents did have standing47—explained
the problem posed by the state officials’ refusal to defend or
appeal:
[T]he governor’s action and the attorney general’s actions have
essentially nullified the considerable efforts on behalf of the initiative
to be placed on the ballot and obtain passage. . . . We have an attorney
general and a governor with no ability to nullify the acts of the people,
and then by not appealing they, in fact, do it.48

Although the Governor does have the authority to veto a bill
passed by the legislature, he or she does not have the power to
nullify a voter-approved initiative, an existing law previously
codified, or an amendment to the constitution.49 Neither does the
Attorney General have any such power.50 Although it can be
argued that they have discretion in enforcing the law, such
discretion simply cannot be allowed to reach to such executive
nonfeasance as is evident in the Hollingsworth case.51 Yet, in
effect, by refusing to defend the law in court, these are exactly
the powers the California Governor and Attorney General are
assuming. Colorado Attorney General John Suthers writes that
“[s]ome attorneys general are wielding the litigation veto for the
same reasons a governor might wield a constitutional veto: [t]hey
strongly disagree with the law. But in contrast to the president
or a governor, there is no constitutional authority for this
litigation veto.”52
The state officials’ refusal to defend Proposition 8 is certainly
dubious as a matter of law, but beyond the questions of mere
legality are much broader policy concerns. Suthers continues to
describe the long-term consequences of such a systematic abuse
of the state’s executive power:
Recently, . . . attorneys general in Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
California have given in to the temptation to abuse the power
entrusted to our position by refusing to defend their states’ bans on
same-sex marriage in court. Depending on one’s view of the laws in
47 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2012) (Smith, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), vacated, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
48 Condon, supra note 42.
49 CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(a).
50 See id. art. V, § 13.
51 See John W. Suthers, A ‘Veto’ Attorneys General Shouldn’t Wield, WASH. POST
(Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-veto-attorneys-general-should
nt-wield/2014/02/02/64082fc8-887e-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html (indicating that
an attorney general has discretion and may even in good faith not defend a law when
binding precedent is “clear” and “unavoidable,” but “[t]hat’s not yet the case with state
laws banning same-sex marriage”).
52 Id.
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question, such a “litigation veto” may, in the short term, be a terrific
thing; an unpopular law is defanged and the attorney general can take
credit—indeed, he can be the hero to his political base and keep his
political ambitions intact. But in the longer term, this practice
corrodes our system of checks and balances, public belief in the power
of democracy and ultimately the moral and legal authority on which
attorneys general must depend.53

As Suthers points out, the problem of this litigation veto is not
just confined to California. Rather, the Court’s decision in
Hollingsworth has set precedent and sent a message to other
states’ executives that they are legally unaccountable for the
intentional refusal to perform their official governing duties.54 As
a result, in addition to California, at least six other state
attorneys general in Kentucky,55 Oregon,56 Nevada,57 Virginia,58
53 Id. at 51. Cf. Andrew DeMillo, Arkansas Attorney General Supports Gay Marriage,
but Will Defend State’s Ban, HUFF. POST (May 3, 2014, 11:36 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/03/arkansas -gay-marriage_n_5259683.html
(indicating that though he personally opposes his state’s ban on same-sex marriage,
Arkansas Attorney General Dustin McDaniel will nevertheless “zealously defend” his
state’s constitution).
54 Hollingsworth, of course, strictly speaking does not say they are legally
unaccountable altogether, but merely restricts standing in federal courts. As a result,
however, acquiring a judicial remedy for such a violation becomes much more difficult as
the Hollingsworth case demonstrates. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that
executive officials such as the Governor and the Attorney General are still politically
accountable and can be voted out of office either at the end of their term or through a
special recall election. See CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 13–14. Nevertheless, at the same time,
political accountability can be quite unresponsive to particular abuses. See Collins
& Myers, supra note 25, at 331 (“The net result is that the slow, cumbersome, and
sometimes unresponsive electoral process remains the only realistic federal forum
available to taxpayers to check legislative and executive abuses.”) (citation omitted);
Taxpayers’ Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895, 910 (1960) (“The need for
[public interest litigation] arises from the absence of alternative means of correcting
illegal practices of government officials which would otherwise be irreparable. One
alternative to taxpayers’ suits is, of course, the elective process itself, but the electorate
may ignore corruption, illegality, or unconstitutionality which occurred early in the term
or which is relatively less eye-catching than the overall record of those in power; elections
present package alternatives, often only two in number, and the voters are disabled from
expressing their views on each governmental act.”) (citation omitted). But see United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (“Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive
though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for
changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a
sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in
performing duties committed to them.”).
55 See Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (holding that the
state’s ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional); see also Brett Barrouquere,
Kentucky Gay Marriage Recognition Put on Hold by Federal Judge, HUFF. POST (Mar. 19,
2014, 5:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/19/kentucky-gay-marriage_n_499
5364.html (indicating that the Kentucky Attorney General Jack Conway will not appeal
the district court’s ruling but that Governor Steve Beshear will step in to appeal by
appointing outside counsel).
56 See Complaint, Rummell v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014) (No.
6:13-cv-02256-MC); Oregon Won’t Defend Gay Marriage Ban in Lawsuit, USA TODAY (Feb.
21, 2014, 12:44 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/21/oregon-gaymarriage-ban/5669719/ (stating that Oregon’s Attorney General will not defend the state’s
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Pennsylvania,59 and Illinois60 have all refused to defend their
states’ laws—not to mention the federal executives’ own failure to
defend the Defense of Marriage Act.61 The corrosive abuse to
which Suthers alludes is not taking any time in eating away at
our system of democracy. Although the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to begin correcting this abuse in Hollingsworth, its
ultimate decision to proscribe the Proponents from litigating a
defense of the law only served to exacerbate the problem and
allow state executives to flaunt the abdication of their official
duties.
Ultimately, the problem exhibited in Hollingsworth is not
just that the Court was unwilling to allow the Proponents of the
initiative to defend the law—though that would have certainly
helped solve the problem in this and other cases concerning the
enforcement of voter ballot-initiatives. Rather, the Court’s
decision exemplifies a much broader problem with the standing
doctrine as a whole that prevents citizens as a class from holding
their government accountable to the law through the judiciary,

ban on same-sex marriage).
57 See Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012) (finding that the
state’s ban on same-sex marriage was not unconstitutional); Nevada Drops Defense of
State’s Same-Sex Marriage Ban, FOX NEWS (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/
politics/2014/02/10/nevada-drops-defense-state-same-sex-marriage-ban/ (citing the
Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval and Attorney General Catherine Masto to claim that
they won’t defend the state’s gay marriage ban on appeal).
58 See Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014) (finding that the state’s
ban on same-sex marriage violates the federal constitution); Steve Szkotak, Virginia
Attorney General Says Gay Marriage Ban is Unconstitutional and Will Not Defend It,
HUFF. POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 7:46 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/23/ virginiagay-marriage_n_4650584.html (indicating Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring won’t
defend the state’s ban on same-sex unions and will “join the fight against it”).
59 See Complaint, Palladino v. Corbett, No. 2:13-cv-05641-MAM (2013), 2014 WL
830046 (challenging Pennsylvania’s ban on same-sex marriage); Juliet Eilperin, Pa.
Attorney General Says She Won’t Defend State’s Gay Marriage Ban, WASH. POST
(July 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/07/11/sourcespa-attorney-general-wont-defend-states-gay-marriage-ban/ (citing Pennsylvania Attorney
General Kathleen Kane as announcing that she will not defend the state’s ban on
same-sex marriage).
60 See Gray v. Orr, 4 F. Supp. 3d 984 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (granting a temporary
restraining order that prohibits a county clerk from enforcing the state’s same-sex
marriage ban). It is interesting to note that the court allowed state Attorney General Lisa
Madigan to be assigned as a plaintiff in the case. Tammy Webber, Illinois Gay
Marriage: State Prosecutors Refuse to Defend Gay Marriage Ban, HUFF. POST (Aug. 21,
2012, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/21/illinois-gay-marriage-sta_0_n
_1615170.html (indicating Madigan won’t defend the state’s same-sex marriage ban in
court).
61 See Niraj Chokshi, Seven Attorneys General Won’t Defend Their Own State’s
Gay-Marriage Bans, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
govbeat/wp/2014/02/20/six-attorneys-general-wont-defend-their-own-states-gay-marriagebans/; see also Holder Gives Nod to State AGs to Drop Defense of Gay Marriage Bans amid
Court Challenges, FOX NEWS (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/02/25/
holder-gives-nod-to-state-ags-to-drop-defense-gay-marriage-bans-amid-court/.
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which was set up and envisioned by the Founder’s
separation-of-powers design to operate as a check on the political
branches. Even if the Court had found the Proponents had
standing to defend their initiative, what would the Court have
done if it had been a typical legislatively adopted statute? Or a
constitutional amendment via a legislative convention rather
than ballot initiative?62 Or even an initiative where its
proponents subsequently refused to defend the law due to
litigation costs? Perhaps, it could be argued, the legislative
representatives would be the appropriate parties to defend a law
in court in the event the executive branch shirks its duties. But
the Court has been reluctant to extend standing to a legislator
who bases his or her claim on nothing more than an institutional
injury to the legislature as a whole.63 Furthermore, in the case of
an initiative adopted by the people rather than the legislature, it
seems that no individual representative would be in any better
position to establish standing than would an ordinary citizen.
Consequently, legislators would likely face many of the same
hurdles to showing injury as did the Proponents in
Hollingsworth.64 Based on the Court’s ruling, it is difficult to
envision just what kind of party, if any, would have standing to
defend the law in Hollingsworth. The other contention is that no
party should have standing to defend the law other than those
officials specifically charged with that duty—namely, the
governor, the attorney general, and other subsidiary executives.65
The only remedy in such a case would then be political: to vote
those state officials out of office and replace them with persons
who would enforce the law. But the political process is not always
sufficiently responsive or capable of correcting such instances of
corruption.66 Does the Court really intend to deny legal
accountability for state executive nonfeasance? Based on the

See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821–26 (1997); see also Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433, 438 (1939) (finding certain circumstances that a legislator could bring a claim
when he had a “plain, direct and adequate interest” in the case).
64 See Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Although appellant’s
status as a legislator introduces somewhat unique considerations into the case at bar, we
must bear in mind that there are no special standards to be employed in analyzing
legislator standing questions.”); see also S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 743–46 (2013)
(summarizing the doctrine of standing for Members of Congress and stating that a
congressional representative “along with every other person attempting to invoke the aid
of a federal court, must show ‘injury in fact’ as a predicate to standing”). But see Hall,
supra note 30, at 1545–51 (explaining how the rules of standing might apply uniquely to
legislative representatives).
65 Although the Court did not say as much in Hollingsworth, it seems to be the
inevitable result of the Court’s final ruling: if the official proponents of a law do not have
standing, then who else besides the attorney general would?
66 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
62
63
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Court’s current doctrine of standing, and its prohibition of
generalized grievances as applied in Hollingsworth, this,
unfortunately, seems to be the conclusion at which the Court has
arrived, and its consequences are only just beginning to be
realized.
III. THE CAUSE: THE STANDING DOCTRINE AND THE
PARTICULARIZED INJURY REQUIREMENT
The Court’s decision in Hollingsworth to deny the
Proponents the right to appeal ultimately flowed from its
doctrine of standing. The doctrine in essence functions as a
principle of separation of powers by limiting those cases that can
be brought before a federal court. It is supposedly derived from
the case or controversy requirement of Article III, Section 2 of the
United States Constitution, which the Court has interpreted to
limit federal judicial jurisdiction to “actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants.”67 Therefore, if the plaintiff and
defendant do not have actual adverse interests in a case, the
Court will simply dismiss it for lack of Article III standing.68 In
order for there to be the requisite adversity, each litigant must
have “a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.”69
The Hollingsworth case presents a unique twist on the
typical application of the standing doctrine to the extent that it
was being applied to an intervening defending party, rather than
a plaintiff. In the vast majority of federal cases, questions of
standing are concerned, as a practical matter, solely with the
nature of a plaintiff’s claim.70 The plaintiff is the one who has or
will imminently suffer an injury, and so he or she is the one
seeking redress in court. Standing is rarely an issue for
defendants because they almost always unquestionably have it.
The threat of an imminent adverse judgment exposes the
defendant to an injury and, thus, confers standing upon him.71 If

67 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . [or]
Controversies.”); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911).
68 Sometimes adversity and standing are treated as separate elements required
under Article III, but as the Court stated in Baker v. Carr, “the gist of the question of
standing” is whether the parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011)
(“To state a case or controversy under Article III, a plaintiff must establish standing.”)
(emphasis added); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“[T]he standing question is
whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy’ . . . .”) (emphasis added).
71 See Hall, supra note 30, at 1552.
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it does not, however, then that destroys standing—for the
adversity element of Article III implies that standing must be
satisfied by both parties lest there not be an actual controversy.72
Therefore, it seems appropriate to require of the defendant, as
much as of the plaintiff, that standing be satisfied. Hollingsworth
also presents a unique situation in light of the fact that the
Proponents were intervening parties to the original action; they
were not named in the plaintiffs’ original complaint but rather
sought to intervene under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.73 The Court has indicated that when the original
parties to the action have standing, any intervening parties need
only satisfy the requirements specifically laid out in Rule 24;
they are not required to independently meet the constitutional
standing requirements of Article III so long as the original
parties do.74 If, however, the original parties lose their standing
or fall out of the case, then any intervening parties who wish to
maintain suit would need to independently satisfy those
requirements. This is why, when the original defendants (the
state officials) refused to appeal the unfavorable district court
ruling, the Proponents were required by the Court to
demonstrate independent Article III standing in order to
maintain a defense of the case on appeal. As a result, because the
parties in question are intervening defendants, Hollingsworth
presents a unique approach to the question of standing; it is hard
to imagine a scenario much different than that of Hollingsworth
where an intervening defendant’s standing is genuinely in
question.75 The general idea of applying the requirements of
standing to an intervening defendant who wishes to make an
independent appeal nevertheless seems appropriate, even if the
particular criteria applied were inappropriate, as this Comment
contends was the case in Hollingsworth. The only question the
Court faces then concerns to whom exactly it should apply those
criteria. The Proponents argued—and the Ninth Circuit found—
that they should be applied to the State of California because the
Proponents were representing the state in the suit. Because the
state certainly has standing to defend its own laws in court, so
72 Id. at 1551 (“The terms ‘case’ and ‘controversy,’ in their nature, presuppose a
dispute with interested parties on both sides; indeed, it makes little sense even to speak of
a case or controversy with only one interested party.”) (citations omitted); see also
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997).
73 See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (laying out the requirements of intervention).
74 Intervention is governed by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the Court has determined that intervening parties need not independently establish the
elements of standing when they are met by the original plaintiff(s) and defendant(s).
See id.; see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986).
75 For a similar situation, see Diamond, 476 U.S. at 57–59 (where a doctor sought to
intervene in defense of an Illinois abortion statute).
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too does its authorized representative—whether that is the
Attorney General or the Proponents of the proposition. The
Supreme Court, however, ultimately rejected this approach,
reasoning that even if they represent the interests of the state,
the Proponents must still independently satisfy the requirements
of standing.76 Assuming that the Court got this right and that the
Proponents themselves must independently satisfy the
requirements of standing, the Hollingsworth decision still
exposes a real analytical problem with the doctrine.
The doctrine of standing is traditionally divided into two
categories: namely, constitutional requirements, which the Court
has interpreted to impose certain essential unalterable demands
of the constitution, and prudential limitations, which tend to be
more flexible and subject to the requirements of the situation and
the laws of Congress.77 The Court has indicated that the three
basic prerequisites of constitutional standing require that: (1) the
party has suffered an injury; (2) the injury is caused by the
conduct complained of in court; and (3) the injury is remediable
by the court.78 Although none of these elements are precisely at
issue in Hollingsworth, the Court has developed a correlated
requirement to the first element necessitating that the injury be
“particularized” and that it “affect the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way.”79 Spelled out and applied, this principle
basically prevents litigants from raising generalized grievances
common to the public at large. Reasoning that certain matters of
widespread concern are better addressed through the political
branches of government, the Court has held this element to
prohibit citizens from attempting to vindicate public rights in
federal court. In Federal Elections Commission v. Akins, for
instance, the Court explained that “the political process, rather
than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate
remedy” for resolving general complaints about the
government.80 Likewise, in Warth v. Seldin, the Court declared
that “other governmental institutions may be more competent to

76 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013) (“But even when we have
allowed litigants to assert the interests of others, the litigants themselves still ‘must have
suffered an injury in fact.’”).
77 See S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 737 (2013).
78 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (“[O]ur cases have
established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three
elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ . . . . Second, there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of . . . . Third,
it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by
a favorable decision.’”).
79 Id. at 560 n.1.
80 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998).
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address” such questions of “wide public significance.”81 In Lujan,
the Court reiterated the principle stating that:
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally
available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and
every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and
laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits
him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case
or controversy.82

Thus, a broad bar on generalized grievances has been maintained
under the auspices of the Court’s standing doctrine. However,
where the Court had previously found this requirement to be a
prudential limitation more readily subject to exceptions,83 the
Court has more recently recognized it as an unalterable maxim of
Article III standing.84 It is this new—though erroneous—
interpretation that seems to necessitate the result of
Hollingsworth. If the Court rather were to have reaffirmed these
requirements as prudential limitations, as it has in the past,
then it could have excepted the Proponents in Hollingsworth
from the general rule, allowed them to make their case in defense
of the law, and prevented the abusive implications of the
litigation veto.
Because it recognized these requirements as constitutional,
however, the Court bound its own hands and was unable to make
an exception for the Proponents’ appeal. Finding that “[t]heir

81 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S 208, 221–22 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (“[T]he absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these
claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.”); Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“[G]eneralized grievances [are] more appropriately addressed in the
representative branches.”). Again, as seen in the Hollingsworth case, the political process
was not sufficient because of the executive officials’ failure to enforce the law. It is
therefore worthwhile to contrast the Court’s policy reasoning in Mellon and Akins with
the policy implications of the Hollingsworth decision. Such consideration should provoke a
serious reconsideration of the Court’s prohibition of generalized grievances.
82 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 754 (“[A]n asserted right to
have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to
confer jurisdiction on a federal court.”); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (“[W]hen the asserted
harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large
class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.”).
83 See S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 737 (2013) (“[I]t is clear that the Court feels free to
disregard any of these prudential rules when it sees fit.”).
84 Although it has settled recently on classifying the requirement as a constitutional
mandate, the Court had previously, though inconsistently, identified it as a prudential
limit. See S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 726; see also, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 499–500
(prudential); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United, 454 U.S. 464, 485, 490 (1982)
(seemingly constitutional); Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (prudential); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575
(constitutional). And most recently in Hollingsworth, the Court cited Lujan with approval
and recognized the element as a constitutional requirement. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133
S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013).
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only interest in having the District Court order reversed was to
vindicate the constitutional validity of a generally applicable
California law,” the Court summarily determined that they could
not satisfy the particularized injury requirement.85 As a
consequence, it held that they had raised nothing more than a
generalized grievance and could not maintain the suit. It is not so
much that the Court lacked precedent; in point of fact, the Court
held very strictly to its most recent decisions even in the face of
its severe adverse implications. Rather, the severity of those
policy implications (following from the legal unaccountability of
state executives) should have prompted the Court to more
seriously consider its application of that precedent to the case at
hand. In Flast v. Cohen, for instance, the Court lowered the
barrier to allow taxpayers to challenge the constitutionality of
congressional taxation or spending—apparently recognizing the
particularized injury requirement as a prudential limitation.86
Flast, however, did not create an open-ended license for citizens
to bring suits against the government; rather, the Court set two
strict criteria to protect this new taxpayer suit from abuse. First,
the taxpayer can only challenge congressional action arising
under the Taxing and Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution.87
Second, the taxpayer must allege that the taxing or spending
power violates a specific constitutional limitation.88 By cracking
open the door to such suits, the Court recognized the importance
of having a judicial remedy available to keep government taxing
and spending accountable to the constitution. On the other hand,
by prescribing strict limitations for the suit, the Court was also
able to prevent abuse of such suits.
Another instance where the Court seemingly allows
exception to the particularized injury requirement comes up in
shareholder derivative actions. As will be shown further in Part
IV, federal courts have allowed shareholders to bring derivative
claims on behalf of their corporation despite the fact that their
injury is shared in common with a great many other
shareholders. Many of the same purposes and policies that have
allowed these cases to proceed in federal court notwithstanding
the lack of a particularized injury should prompt the Court to
reconsider its decision in Hollingsworth and allow citizens in
certain circumstances to bring suit against—or, as the case may
be, on behalf of—the government.
The taxpayer and the derivative suit exceptions both
85
86
87
88

Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
Id.; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.
Flast, 392 U.S. at 102–03.
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indicate that the requirement of a particularized injury is really
only a matter of prudential standing. If the Court genuinely
believed that the requirement flowed from a constitutional
mandate, then no statute or precedent to the contrary could
consistently permit such exceptions. Rather, the Court has and
continues to allow these exceptions in recognition of certain great
policy concerns. Whatever the proper classification of the
particularized injury requirement—whether prudential, as it was
in the past, or constitutional, as it is currently formulated—the
Court clearly makes exceptions to it and should seriously
consider doing so for cases like Hollingsworth.
IV. THE SOLUTION: THE SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUIT AS A
MODEL EXCEPTION
The theory of a shareholder derivative action is in principle
not very different from the idea of a public interest citizen suit.
But where the Court has recognized and affirmed the former, it
has generally rejected the latter for lack of standing. Derivative
suits to be sure are subject to strict limitations and procedures to
prevent their abuse as they rightly should be,89 but unlike citizen
suits they are not proscribed altogether from being brought in
federal court. Despite the lack of a particularized injury to any
one shareholder that is differentiable from that suffered by every
other shareholder, the Court continues to recognize the
importance of making an exception to that requirement in order
to allow shareholders access to a judicial remedy that can hold
management accountable and enforce the rights of the
corporation. In this way, the derivative suit exemplifies the
Court’s own willingness to lower the bar on standing in certain
circumstances. In the same manner then, it is here proposed
that—subject to rational limitations and requirements to prevent
abuse—citizens should be entitled to hold their government
accountable to the law and bring their grievances before a court
of law even if they allege nothing more than a common and
widespread injury.
In essence, the derivative suit is the right of a shareholder to
assert a right or claim on behalf of the corporation.90 Under
business law, a properly formed corporation is a discrete legal
entity subject to its own rights and liabilities, which are
ordinarily distinct from that of its shareholding owners.91 In a
See infra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.
Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991) (“A shareholder derivative suit is a
uniquely equitable remedy in which a shareholder asserts on behalf of a corporation a
claim belonging not to the shareholder, but to the corporation.”).
91 Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come With Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction in
89
90
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typical corporate paradigm, shareholders vote to elect a board of
directors who in turn appoint executive officers to manage the
affairs of the corporation. Therefore, not unlike a republican form
of government, although shareholders own the business and may
elect their representatives on the board, they do not control or
dictate the day-to-day business decisions of the company. Thus,
operational decisions—including the right to bring suit on behalf
of the corporation—normally fall within the discretion of
corporate management.92 However, in certain circumstances, the
directors and officers may refuse to bring a suit that they
otherwise rightly should in the best interests of the company. For
example, the directors might be guilty of fraud, self-dealing,
mismanagement, negligence, waste of corporate assets or of
acting on some other personal interest that conflicts with the
interests of the corporation. Or they might simply have acted
ultra vires—that is, in excess of their authorized authority under
either state law or the corporation’s charter and bylaws.93 In
whichever of these instances, those persons responsible for
managing the corporation will be unlikely to direct the company
to file suit against themselves.94 In theory, if shareholders
disagreed with the directors’ decisions, they could vote them out
of office and elect new directors who would appoint new officers
who would bring the suit and enforce the company’s legal rights.
In practice, however, the Court has found that shareholder
voting is simply insufficient as a mechanism of corporate
managerial accountability.95 Consequently, the Court extended a
judicial remedy to shareholders by allowing them to step in and
represent the corporation’s legal interests through derivative
proceedings. For this reason, the Court acknowledged, the

the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 131 (2013).
92 Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting Ideologies of Group Litigation: Who May Challenge
Settlements in Class Actions and Derivative Suits?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 81, 100 (1998)
(“Under the basic corporate law paradigm, shareholders, as owners of the corporation,
elect directors to manage the corporation on the shareholders’ behalf and to make
decisions affecting the corporation, including the decision to initiate litigation.”).
93 Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality
(With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L.
REV. 1279, 1307 (2001) (“A shareholder could bring a derivative action on behalf of the
corporation to recover damages suffered from an ultra vires transaction.”).
94 Gregory P. Williams & Evan O. Williford, Derivative Litigation: Fundamental
Concepts and Recent Developments, in 2005 REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS AND
CORPORATE LITIGATION 444, 448 (2005), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/
newsletter/0039/materials/pp5.pdf.
95 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547–48 (1949) (“The vast
aggregate of funds committed to corporate control came to be drawn to a considerable
extent from numerous and scattered holders of small interests. The director was not
subject to an effective accountability. . . . This remedy born of stockholder helplessness was
long the chief regulator of corporate management and has afforded no small incentive to
avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal of stockholders’ interests.”) (emphasis added).
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purpose of the “derivative action was to place in the hands of the
individual shareholder a means to protect the interests of the
corporation from misfeasance and malfeasance of ‘faithless
directors and managers.’”96 As an owner of the business, the
shareholder’s purpose in protecting the corporation is to protect
his or her own financial investment, although that is a
generalized injury that the individual shareholder shares with
all other shareholders. Even though the shareholder suffers no
particularized injury, the Court permits this kind of derivative
action when management exceeds its authority under the
corporation’s constitution—that is, its charter and bylaws.
Ordinarily shareholders would lack standing as individuals
to bring suit because of the absence of a particularized injury.
The only injury the shareholder suffers is derivative of the harm
done to the company and thus shared in common with all of the
other stockholders.97 If the shareholder did suffer a personal,
individualized injury, then there would be no need for derivative
proceedings; that individual could just bring a personal claim
against the company.98 For example, if the shareholder suffered a
loss of voting rights due to a corporate reorganization, that
shareholder would suffer a personal and particularized injury
because it was him or her who was entitled to those voting rights
as opposed to the corporation.99 In that case, the shareholder
could sue the corporation and the directors directly rather than
derivatively on behalf of the corporation. In contrast, the
derivative suit is meant to cover injuries to the corporation that
harm all the shareholders through their equity interests in the
company. As Richard Epstein points out, the “derivative action is
meant to cover cases where no particular shareholders
have . . . suffered any special injury at all.”100 For many large
publicly-traded companies, a derivative claim would run into
many of the same concerns that the Court has expressed relating
to plaintiffs who raise generalized grievances about
government—namely that such grievances would be better
addressed through electoral procedures and voting processes. As
noted above, such processes are not always sufficient to hold
management accountable.101 Therefore, because the shareholder
lacks particularized injury and raises little more than a
96 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (citing Beneficial
Indus., 337 U.S. at 548).
97 Kim, supra note 92, at 102–03.
98 See id. (noting that sometimes it can be difficult to discern between a direct and
derivative injury/claim); see also Williams & Williford, supra note 94, at 449–52.
99 See Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1971).
100 Epstein, supra note 3, at 26.
101 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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widely-shared grievance about corporate management, the
derivative suit ordinarily could not satisfy general standing
requirements.
In light of weighty policy considerations, however, the
Supreme Court created an exception to the particularized injury
requirement for the derivative suit. In Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., the Court explained:
Equity came to the relief of the stockholder, who had no standing to
bring civil action at law against faithless directors and managers.
Equity, however, allowed him to step into the corporation’s shoes and
to seek in its right the restitution he could not demand on his
own. . . . [W]hen, as was usual, those who perpetrated the wrongs also
were able to obstruct any remedy, equity would hear and adjudge the
corporation’s cause through its stockholder. . . . This remedy born of
stockholder helplessness was long the chief regulator of corporate
management and has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least
grosser forms of betrayal of stockholders’ interest. It is argued, and
not without reason, that without it there would be little practical
check on such abuses.102

Born in equity and later codified in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a shareholder bringing a derivative suit, therefore,
need not satisfy all of the requirements of standing.103
Furthermore, that the Court has allowed shareholder suits to
avoid the particularized injury requirement indicates that this
specific requirement is merely prudential: for while states can
alter prudential limitations, constitutional limitations are in
theory fixed and unchangeable. A different standard is allotted
for derivative suits under the federal rules requiring only that
(1) the plaintiff be a shareholder in the corporation and (2) the
plaintiff fairly and adequately represent the interests of other
similarly situated shareholders in enforcing the rights of the
corporation.104 These less exacting standing requirements stand
in contrast to the elements normally required to satisfy standing.
The Court is thus willing to set aside certain limitations in the
interest
of
maintaining
strong
corporate
managerial
accountability.
Rather than broadly prohibiting derivative actions, federal
courts
have
opened
wide
the
class
of
eligible
plaintiff-shareholders who can bring the suit. Of course,
recognizing the dangers arising from abuse of such derivative

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (emphasis added).
Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 1983).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41 (2005); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:3-6.2 (West 2015).
102
103
104
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proceedings (often called “strike suits”),105 the Court has allowed
the institution of certain other preconditions on plaintiffs who
wish to bring such actions against their company and directors.
One such condition often requires that the plaintiff post expenses
to cover the corporation’s legal fees in the event that the
shareholder loses the case.106 Another condition usually
necessitates that—prior to bringing suit—the shareholder must
make a demand upon the corporation and directors to properly
file the suit or else the shareholder must meet a high burden of
showing that such a demand would be futile.107 These two
conditions thereby act as guardians of the derivative action in
order to prevent the abuse of the suit and extortion of
management for settlement value. Even these conditions,
however, do not constrain the class of eligible plaintiffs but
simply require that they clear certain hurdles to demonstrate the
legitimacy of their suit.
Given the importance the Court attaches to maintaining
corporate accountability, as illustrated by the creation of a
standing exception for the derivative suit, is it really
unreasonable for the Proponents and the citizens of California to
ask the Court to recognize a corresponding exception for them to
hold their state executives accountable to the law? Their plight is
certainly not beyond comparison to that of the shareholders. In
both cases, executive management is refusing to sustain a
lawsuit that it rightly should. Comparable to corporate directors’
and officers’ refusal to institute a suit, the Governor and
Attorney General in Hollingsworth refused to defend a state law
105 For a discussion of strike suits, see William M. Lafferty & W. Leighton Lord III,
Towards a Relaxed Summary Judgment Standard for the Delaware Court of Chancery: A
New Weapon Against “Strike” Suits, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921, 924 (1990).
106 For an example of such a requirement, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6.8 (West
2015) (“In any derivative proceeding or shareholder class action instituted by a
shareholder or shareholders holding less than 5% of the outstanding shares of any class or
series of the corporation, unless the shares have a market value in excess of $250,000, the
corporation in whose right the action is brought shall be entitled at any time before final
judgment to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable expenses,
including fees of attorneys, that may be incurred by it in connection with the action or
may be incurred by other parties named as defendant for which it may become legally
liable.”). For further analysis of “Security for Expense” statutes, see John B. Lieberman
III, Corporations – Stockholders’ Suit - State Security for Expenses Statute Is Inapplicable
in Stockholders’ Derivative Suit in Federal Court for Violation of Securities Exchange Act
Provision and Regulation Thereunder, 7 VILL. L. REV. 292, 292–94 (1962).
107 For an example of such a demand requirement, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42
(2005) (“No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: (1) a written
demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action; and (2) 90 days have
expired from the date the demand was made unless the shareholder has earlier been
notified that the demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury
to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period.”). For a
broader analysis and discussion of the requirement, see Williams & Williford, supra note
94, at 452–89.
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and then to appeal the unfavorable district court ruling.108 In
both cases, the electoral power of voting is insufficient to hold
those officials accountable. The Court clearly stated as much of
the corporate scheme in Cohen, and there are good reasons for
thinking that is equally true of the state.109 In both cases, the
parties are seeking a judicial remedy to enforce the rights of their
respective state and corporate organizations. Where the
shareholder seeks to file suit on behalf of the business, the
citizen-Proponents in Hollingsworth sought to appeal the suit on
behalf of the state. And, most relevantly, in both cases the
parties lack a direct particularized injury. The injury to the
shareholders arises from the harm caused to the corporation and
is shared in common with all of the stockholders while the
citizen-Proponents’ injury arises from harm caused to the state
that is shared in common by all its citizens.110 Yet, in one
instance, the Court was willing to create an exception to the
requirements of standing while in the other it refused to grant
any such exception. This inconsistency highlights the weighty
countervailing policy considerations that the Court simply
refused to address in Hollingsworth.111
CONCLUSION
Perhaps there are concerns about the separation of
governmental powers and even questions of federalism in
Hollingsworth that are not present in the derivative suit, but
that by no means obviates the necessity of having legal
accountability for the executive branches of government. Ever
since Marbury v. Madison, it has been the Court’s role to
interpret the law and check the constitutional boundaries of the
other branches of government.112 For this reason, Richard
Epstein notes that the doctrine of standing “operates at cross
purposes with the function of judicial review.”113 Marbury on the
one hand empowers courts to review the actions of coordinate
branches of government while Mellon and its standing prodigy
have limited that power. The doctrine of standing therefore
becomes a matter of balancing the dangers of federal judicial
activism with the dangers of executive and legislative abdication.
Hollingsworth illustrates the latter and the Court’s concurrent
failure to check the exercise of that power. As illustrated by the

108
109
110
111
112
113

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2013).
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661.
See supra Parts I–II.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Epstein, supra note 3, at 2.
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shareholder derivative suit, it would not have been beyond the
Court’s reasonable power to recognize a limited exception to the
prudential doctrines of standing in order to remedy such an
executive abuse. That the Court wished to avoid deciding the
merits of such a controversial case is perhaps understandable,
but its refusal to adjudicate the matter on grounds of standing is
not so excusable. To the extent that it allows executive state
officials to disregard the law without appropriate legal
accountability, the Court’s decision to abdicate that responsibility
may turn out to be far more controversial and damaging than
any adjudication on the merits could possibly have been.
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